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INTRODUCTION
Lance Raygor believed that his employer, the University of Min-
nesota, had discriminated against him because of his age. He sued the
University, an arm of the state, in federal court under the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act' (ADEA) and the Minnesota
Human Rights Act In its pleadings, the state asserted sovereign im-
munity from federal jurisdiction and the district court agreed, dismiss-
ing the plaintiff's claims under the Eleventh Amendment.' Raygor
appealed, but withdrew his appeal for lack of a substantial federal
question after the Supreme Court determined that the ADEA did not
validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. Raygor refiled his state
law claim in state court, where it was dismissed on the ground that the
statute of limitations had expired.' Raygor appealed, alleging that the
federal supplemental jurisdiction statute's tolling provision should
have tolled the statute of limitations on his state law claim and
thereby foreclosed the state's statute of limitations defense. The Min-
t B.A. 2001, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 2006, The University of Chicago.
1 29 USC § 621 (2000).
2 Minn Stat §§ 363.01-363.20 (1996).
3 See Raygor v Regents of the University of Minnesota, 604 NW2d 128,130 (Minn App 2000).
4 See Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62,91-92 (2000) (holding that the ADEA
was not a valid exercise of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment, as Congress
had little evidence of age discrimination by the states).
5 See Regents of the University of Minnesota v Raygor, 620 NW2d 680,682 (Minn 2001).
6 28 USC § 1367(d) (2000):
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [federal supplemental jurisdiction],
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as
or after the dismissal of the claim under [federal supplemental jurisdiction], shall be tolled
while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law
provides for a longer tolling period.
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nesota Supreme Court7 and then the United States Supreme Court'
disagreed. The United States Supreme Court held that the state of
Minnesota had timely raised an Eleventh Amendment defense in fed-
eral court and that the tolling provision did not manifest an attempt
by Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity.9 Hence, the tolling
provision did not apply and the statute of limitations had expired.
Raygor never got the chance to litigate his case on the merits.
Raygor's story is unfortunate, but as the Supreme Court noted in
his case, the state defendant had never consented to federal jurisdic-
tion.'° By broadly holding that the tolling provision does not abrogate
the sovereign immunity of nonconsenting states, the Court seemed to
make application of the provision to states contingent upon state con-
sent. But the holding leaves an unanswered question: does the tolling
provision apply to states that initially consent to federal jurisdiction
over state law claims against them?"
This Comment argues that § 1367(d)'s tolling provision could be
unconstitutional as applied if it precludes a state defendant from rais-
ing an otherwise valid statute of limitations defense to a state law
claim, even if the state had previously consented to federal jurisdiction
over that claim.
Consider the following counterfactual hypothetical: imagine that
Raygor originally filed suit in state court, but this time the state con-
sented to federal jurisdiction by removing the case to federal court.
Later the federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
and dismissed the state law claim, but Raygor refiled in state court
where the University moved for dismissal on the ground that the stat-
ute of limitations had expired. Faced with this defense, Raygor might
advance three theories: First, that tolling of the state law claim is per-
missible as a matter of state law, either because the statute of limita-
tions is a mere procedural limitation on liability subject to equitable
tolling or because a state litigator enjoys the delegated power to con-
sent to tolling. Second, in the alternative, that the federal tolling provi-
7 See Raygor, 620 NW2d at 685 ("Because Congress cannot, absent valid abrogation of
sovereign immunity, extend federal judicial power against unconsenting states, it follows that
Congress cannot impose a penalty on a state defendant for being named, without its consent, as a
defendant in federal court.").
8 See generally Raygor v Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 US 533 (2002).
9 See id at 546 ("In sum, although § 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for claims
against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, we are looking for a
clear statement of what the rule includes, not a clear statement of what it excludes.").
10 Id at 547 ("[Wle cannot say that respondent 'unequivocally expressed' a consent to be
sued in federal court."), citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89, 99
(1984).
11 See Raygor, 534 US at 547 ("We express no view on the application or constitutionality
of § 1367(d) when a State consents to suit.").
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sion preempts the state statute of limitations either (a) because a state
litigator, pursuant to his power under federal law to waive the state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity, could consent that the state be
bound by the federal tolling provision, or (b) because Congress had
acted independently to delegate him the power to consent to tolling.
Finally, even if the foregoing arguments did not succeed, Raygor could
argue that the University ought to be estopped from denying its con-
sent to tolling.
This Comment considers all these arguments and outlines a sce-
nario wherein a court might reject them all depending on the law of
any particular state. The Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I is an
overview of supplemental jurisdiction and the doctrine of state sover-
eign immunity. Part II addresses the state and federal law of state
waiver of sovereign immunity. Part III discusses the applicability of
the tolling provision as a matter of state law. Part IV argues that fed-
eral law does not preempt the state law statute of limitations if the
state law does not allow for tolling. Part V contends that states should
not be estopped from asserting an otherwise valid statute of limita-
tions defense. This Comment then concludes with the suggestion that,
in light of this uncertainty and the difficulty of determining ex ante
whether a statute of limitations defense will be valid if a case is refiled
in state court, plaintiffs should be wary of filing state law claims
against state sovereigns in federal court. Federal judges should be
wary of using their discretion to dismiss mandatory counterclaims
against states and should remand, rather than dismiss, unwelcome
state law claims where they have the discretion to do so.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND § 1367(D)
Because the law of sovereign immunity is unusually dependent
upon historical context, it is appropriate to provide a general outline
of the history of the immunity and its interaction with federal supple-
mental jurisdiction before wading into a detailed consideration of
waiver doctrine.
A. Sovereign Immunity
1. History of sovereign immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in 1798 to overturn the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v Georgia.2 In that case, the
Court determined that Article III of the U.S. Constitution authorized
it to hear a common law contract claim brought by an out-of-state
12 2 US (2 Dal) 419 (1793).
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plaintiff against the state of Georgia.3 Popular reaction was swift and
unfavorable, leading to rapid passage of the Eleventh Amendment."
Although the language of the Amendment speaks only to suits against
a state by citizens of another state or a foreign state, the Supreme
Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment confirms that the
states' traditional privilege of sovereign immunity was incorporated
into the Constitution. Despite criticism, 6 the Court has broadly held
that states are immune from suit by their own citizens, 7 by foreign
states,8 by Indian tribes, by federal corporations,'O in admiralty,' in
13 See id at 452 ("[W]hen a state, by adopting the constitution, has agreed to be amenable to
the judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty.").
14 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." US Const Amend XI. See David P Currie,
The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801 195-98 (Chicago 1997); David P
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 1789-1888 14-20 (Chi-
cago 1985).
15 See Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak,501 US 775,779 (1991):
Despite the narrowness of its terms ... we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure
which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact;
that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty.
Controversially, the Court has viewed this background understanding of sovereign immunity
as a constitutional right reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment (or the enumerated
powers doctrine that it makes explicit), not subject to modification by routine practice as it
would be under a mere common law understanding. See Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 760-61
(1999) (Souter dissenting) ("[A] State's sovereign immunity from all individual suits is a 'funda-
mental aspect' of state sovereignty 'confirmfed]' by the Tenth Amendment.").
16 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the doctrine has been substantially criticized not
only by dissenting justices, see, for example, College Savings Bank v Florida Prepaid Postsecond-
ary Education Expense Board, 527 US 666,688 (1999) (complaining about the "now-fashionable
revisionist accounts of the Eleventh Amendment set forth in other opinions in a degree of re-
petitive detail that has despoiled our northern woods"), but also by academics arguing that the
Amendment should only function as a restriction on federal court jurisdiction in cases that
would otherwise be appropriate in a federal forum solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
See, for example, James E. Pfander, History and State Suability:An "Explanatory"Account of the
Eleventh Amendment, 83 Cornell L Rev 1269, 1280 (1998):
[O]nce the Court begins to conceptualize the problem of state suability in terms of a free-
standing principle of "sovereign immunity," rather than as a technical problem in the pars-
ing of the language of judicial power, it unleashes a dangerous and unwieldy restriction on
the federal courts' power to enforce federal-law restrictions against the states.
Regardless of the merit of the criticisms leveled by these so-called diversity theorists, see id at
1353, the Court has adhered to a broader theory of sovereign immunity since at least 1890. It is
beyond the scope of this Comment to address whether the current theory is in fact what the
Framers had in mind in 1787 and 1798.
17 See Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 20-21 (1889).
18 See Monaco v Mississippi, 292 US 313,330 (1934).
19 See Blatchford, 501 US at 781-82.
20 See Smith v Reeves, 178 US 436,449 (1900).
21 See Ex Parte New York, 256 US 490,500 (1921).
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their own courts on federal causes of action,22 and before administra-
tive tribunals2"
Although it may seem strange that an immunity that limits "the
judicial power of the United States" can be overcome by consent, tra-
ditionally, the Supreme Court did not classify Eleventh Amendment
immunity as immunity from either subject matter or personal jurisdic-
tion, but rather as a sort of hybrid jurisdictional immunity that did not
fit neatly into either category." The Court has clearly declared that
states may voluntarily waive the immunity 1 and that it need not be
raised sua sponte by courts," propositions that are inconsistent with
treating sovereign immunity as a class of subject matter jurisdiction.
Yet courts also allow states to raise the sovereign immunity defense at
any time,27 a proposition more in accord with subject matter than per-
sonal jurisdiction."
The current state of the jurisdictional bar is a matter of contro-
versy for both courts" and commentators,' and the existence and im-
portance of a possible change are discussed below." From the perspec-
tive of history, the important insight is that while the Eleventh
Amendment certainly confers jurisdictional immunity, the immunity
22 See Alden, 527 US at 754.
23 See Federal Maritime Commission v South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 US 743,
760 (2002).
24 See Wisconsin Department of Corrections v Schacht, 524 US 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy
concurring).
25 See Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436, 447 (1883) ("The immunity from suit belonging to a
State, which is respected and protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial power
of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure.").
26 See Patsy v Board of Regents of Florida, 457 US 496,516 n 19 (1982).
27 See, for example, Bravo Perazza v Puerto Rico, 218 F Supp 2d 176, 179 (D PR 2002)
(permitting a state defendant to raise an immunity defense claim after it filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment). But see Ku v Tennessee, 322 F3d 431,434-35 (6th Cir 2003) (holding that once a
state has consented to federal jurisdiction it may not invoke its Eleventh Amendment immunity right).
28 See Schacht, 524 US at 394 (Kennedy concurring) ("Permitting the immunity to be
raised at any stage of the proceedings . . . is more consistent with regarding the Eleventh
Amendment as a limit on the federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction."), citing Insurance Corp
of Ireland v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US 694, 702--04 (1982).
29 Compare Maysonet-Robles v Cabrero, 323 F3d 43,50 n 5 (1st Cir 2003) (discussing Lapides
v Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 535 US 613 (2002), and stating that
Lapides's "relatively narrow holding did not alter the hybrid nature of the Eleventh Amend-
ment" to "track more closely ... [to] personal jurisdiction"), with Ku, 322 F3d at 434-35 (stating
that Lapides is consistent "only with the view that the immunity defense [of the Eleventh
Amendment] ... should be treated like the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction").
30 Compare Eric Porterfield, Comment, Eleventh Amendment Immunity after Lapides v.
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia: Keeping States out of Federal Court, 55
Baylor L Rev 1243, 1277 (2003) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment has been transformed into a
defense, such that it must be raised early in the trial on the merits or immunity is waived."), with
Melvyn Durchslag, State Sovereign Immunity 96 (Praeger 2002) (discussing the hybrid nature of
the Eleventh Amendment in the wake of Lapides).
31 See Part II.B.
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traditionally has not quite matched with either of the two types of
jurisdiction normally recognized as necessary for a suit to proceed.
2. Sovereign immunity in practice.
In light of the Court's current, expansive treatment of state sov-
ereign immunity, there are only two ways that a suit against a state
defendant may proceed: congressional abrogation or state waiver.
a) Congressional abrogation. Congress may abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its powers under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 but, with one exception unrelated to the
subject matter of this Comment,33 not when acting pursuant to antece-
dent constitutional provisions such as Article I' Because the Supreme
Court has determined that Congress did not attempt to abrogate sov-
ereign immunity when it adopted § 1367(d), the hypothetical pre-
sented in the introduction focuses on the question that the Court has
left unanswered: can the tolling provision apply to states anyway? In
other words, although Congress has not abrogated state immunity
from the tolling provision, do states relinquish that immunity by waiv-
ing their immunity from federal jurisdiction over a substantive state
law claim?
b) State waiver. Waiver theory is discussed in greater depth in
Part II, but here it is worth considering waiver in terms of the practical
relevance of the hypothetical presented in the introduction. Although
it might seem unusual for states to consent to supplemental jurisdic-
tion in federal court, in fact they do so frequently. By doing relatively
common things, such as filing a patent suit in federal court, states
waive immunity from compulsory counterclaims filed by any defen-
dants.33 States also waive immunity when they consent to removal in
cases where other litigants that do not enjoy sovereign immunity, such
32 See Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 456 (1976) (noting that Congress has the power to
create private causes of action against states to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
33 States are deemed to have ceded their sovereign immunity in the plan of the union with
respect to the federal bankruptcy power. See Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 126 S
Ct 990,1005 (2006).
34 See College Savings Bank, 527 US at 670 ("[W]e have recognized only two circum-
stances in which an individual may sue a State. First, Congress may authorize such a suit in the
exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment .... Second, a State may waive its
sovereign immunity by consenting to suit."). See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US
44, 66 (1996) ("Fitzpatrick cannot be read to justify 'limitations of the principle of the Eleventh
Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution."'), quoting Pennsyl-
vania v Union Gas Co 491 US 1, 42 (1989) (Scalia dissenting).
35 See, for example, In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc, 119 F3d 1140, 1148
(4th Cir 1997).
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as individuals and municipalities, " are joined as defendants with the
sovereign state."
Although the district court enjoys the power to remand rather
than dismiss a removed case, this Comment considers the possibility
of removal and discretionary dismissal for two reasons. First, it pro-
vides an easy comparator with decided cases like Raygor v Regents of
the University of Minnesota." Second, and more important, by remov-
ing a case to federal court, a litigating officer exercises his maximum
authority to waive immunity from federal jurisdiction, so the reason-
ing in this Comment should also encompass arguably less comprehen-
sive waivers, such as waivers with respect to certain types of counter-
claims.4. In any waiver where the statute of limitations on a state law
claim might expire if the claim had to be refiled in state court, the
analysis of the constitutionality of the tolling provision as applied to
the hypothetical should be appropriate.
B. The Supplemental Jurisdiction Tolling Provision
Congress passed the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
USC § 1367, after the Supreme Court provoked legislative specifica-
tion of when federal jurisdiction over nondiverse state law claims was
appropriate." Subsection (d) reads:
36 State subdivisions do not enjoy sovereign immunity. Monell v Department of Social
Services of the City of New York, 436 US 658 (1978).
37 See, for example, Omosegbon v Wells, 335 F3d 668, 673 (7th Cir 2003) (noting that Indi-
ana waived its sovereign immunity when it consented to removal after being joined as a code-
fendant with university officials).
38 See Hinson v Norwest Financial South Carolina Inc, 239 F3d 611, 616 (4th Cir 2001)
(noting that several removal statutes-28 USC §§ 1441(c), 1447(c), 1447(e), and 1452-authorize
a federal district court to remand a case to state court). See also Hyde Park Co v Santa Fe City
Council, 226 F3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir 2000) (noting that the district court, pursuant to discre-
tionary authority granted by § 1367(c)(3), remanded pendant state law claims after a dismissal of
all federal claims). A remand, as opposed to a dismissal followed by refiling, avoids interdiction
of the statute of limitations. See Carnegie-Mellon University v Cohill, 484 US 343, 352 (1988)
(noting that "state statutes of limitations thus provide a potent reason for giving federal district
courts discretion to remand, as well as to dismiss, removed pendent claims"). However, if a plain-
tiff attempted to avert the problem pointed out in this Comment and preempt removal by filing
in both federal and state court, this would likely run afoul of most anti-claim-splitting rules, so
the first-reached judgment would be res judicata against the second. See, for example, Ellis v
Gallatin Steel Co, 390 F3d 461, 479 (6th Cir 2004), citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments §
24 (1982) ("[A] plaintiff must join all claims arising from the same set of facts in a single pro-
ceeding and cannot split them across multiple fora.").
39 534 US 533 (2002).
40 See, for example, Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F3d at 1148 (noting that a state waives Elev-
enth Amendment immunity "to the extent a defendant's assertions in a state-instituted federal
action ... amount to a compulsory counterclaim"). For more discussion of waivers of immunity
from federal jurisdiction, see Part II.C.
41 See Finley v United States, 490 US 545,556 (1989):
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The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection
(a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily
dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim
under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending
and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law
41provides for a longer tolling period.
Although the Supreme Court has heard two challenges to the
constitutionality of the tolling provision, it has never considered the
constitutionality of the provision as applied to a state that has con-
sented to federal court jurisdiction over an otherwise immune claim,
but then had the federal court employ its discretion to decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction. In Jinks v Richland County,3 the Court held § 1367(d)
facially constitutional as "necessary and proper" to Congress's Article
I power "[tlo constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,"
and to assure that those tribunals adequately exercise "[t]he judicial
power of the United States,'" under Article III. However, in Raygor,
the Court avoided a constitutional question on congressional abroga-
tion of sovereign immunity by construing § 1367(d) not to apply to a
defendant state that had successfully moved for dismissal in federal
court on Eleventh Amendment grounds.47 Although Jinks refers only
to powers antecedent to the Eleventh Amendment7 rather than any
congressional power to guarantee due process, and thus hints that
Congress could not have abrogated the sovereign immunity of uncon-
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of
course be changed by Congress. What is of paramount importance is that Congress be able
to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect
of the language it adopts.
42 See 28 USC § 1367(d). Section 1367(a) says that, subject to certain exceptions for diver-
sity jurisdiction and the court's discretionary power to decline to hear supplemental claims,
in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall in-
clude claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
43 538 US 456 (2003).
44 US Const Art 1, § 8, cl 9.
45 US Const Art III, § 1.
46 Jinks, 538 US at 462.
47 534 US at 543-46 (applying a "clear statement" test to ensure that the Court would not
infringe on a Constitutional scheme "with which Congress does not readily interfere"), quoting
Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452,461 (2002).
48 Reliance on these powers also provides a clear distinction from the reasoning of Katz,
126 S Ct at 997. See note 33. Whatever may be the case with respect to the bankruptcy power, if
Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity when "necessary and proper" to its power to
"establish Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court," state immunity from federal jurisdiction
would be a nullity.
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senting states, it does not resolve whether the tolling provision may
constitutionally apply to states that initially consent to federal jurisdic-
tion. The answer to that question requires detailed consideration of
Eleventh Amendment waiver doctrine.
II. WAIVERS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
This Part addresses the scope of waivers of sovereign immunity.
Specifically, it outlines the different aspects of sovereign immunity
that a state can waive and the combination of waivers necessary for a
federal rule to apply to allow for tolling. It also addresses the alloca-
tion of authority among the branches of state government to effect a
waiver or to modify its terms. Part II.A describes the multilayered
nature of sovereign immunity. Part II.B addresses state waiver of im-
munity under state law. Part II.C discusses the federal law of state
waiver of immunity from federal jurisdiction.
A. The Two-Tiered Nature of State Sovereign Immunity
The restriction on federal jurisdiction encoded in the Eleventh
Amendment rests on an understanding that, a priori, states enjoy an
underlying immunity from suit.49 Sometimes this underlying immunity
is phrased in jurisdictional terms and sometimes it manifests itself as a
substantive immunity from liability Either way, state sovereign im-
munity is actually a two-tiered defense from private suit brought in
federal court: (1) immunity from either jurisdiction or liability in state
court, and (2) immunity from federal jurisdiction over claims against
the state."
Because of the two-tiered nature of the defense, two steps are re-
quired for a federal court to rule on the merits of a state law claim
against a state: (1) a state must waive its underlying immunity, usually
by creating a cause of action against itself, and (2) a state must consent
to federal jurisdiction.
49 Lapides v Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 535 US 613, 617-18
(2002). See also Stewart v North Carolina, 393 F3d 484, 488 (4th Cir 2005) (discussing the differ-
ence between Eleventh Amendment immunity and the broader concept of sovereign immunity).
50 Compare LaRoche v Doe, 134 NH 562,594 A2d 1297, 1300 (1991) ("Sovereign immunity
is a jurisdictional question."), with Maryland v Sharafeldin, 382 Md 129, 854 A2d 1208, 1219-20
(2004) (construing sovereign immunity as a defense from substantive liability in state court).
Although the dictum of Kawananakoa v Polyblank, 205 US 349, 353 (1907), that sovereign
immunity is based "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends," is often cited, that case's seeming
endorsement of the substantive immunity from liability theory has not prevailed everywhere.
51 See Stewart, 393 F3d at 490 (describing the waiver of underlying immunity as well as immu-
nity from federal jurisdiction as necessary for state waiver of sovereign immunity in federal court).
2006]
The University of Chicago Law Review
1. Waiving underlying immunity.
A state constitution or legislature usually waives the state's un-
derlying sovereign immunity by creating a cause of action against the
state. In a few states, however, state litigators also can waive underly-
ing immunity from any cause of action that could be brought against
private citizens.52
2. Consenting to federal jurisdiction.
Unless a constitutional or statutory waiver explicitly provides for
federal jurisdiction,53 a state litigating officer must act to waive the
state's immunity from federal jurisdiction over that claim. 1 For exam-
ple, in Raygor the mere existence of the Minnesota Human Rights Act
did not create federal supplemental jurisdiction over Minnesota when
the state was sued on both federal and state law claims; the state had
to consent to jurisdiction. Section 1367(d) could only apply to a claim
against a state as an element of consensual supplemental federal ju-
risdiction."
52 See 39th-40th Corp v Port of New York Authority, 188 Misc 657, 65 NYS2d 712, 713
(1946) (permitting the state defendant to waive its sovereign immunity by entering an appear-
ance). For discussion of how this could be so, see Part II.C.2.
53 See Florida Dept of Health and Rehabilitative Services v Florida Nursing Home Assn,
450 US 147.149-50 (1981) (refusing to infer a waiver of federal court immunity from a legislative
grant of authority to "sue and be sued"); Kennecott Copper Corp v State Tax Commission, 327
US 573, 578-79 (1946) (refusing to infer a waiver of federal immunity from a legislative state-
ment authorizing suits against the state "in any court of competent jurisdiction"); Smith v Reeves,
178 US 436, 447-49 (1900) (refusing to infer from a state's consent to suit in its own courts a
waiver of immunity from federal jurisdiction). See also College Savings Bank v Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 US 666, 676 (1999) ("Thus, a State does not con-
sent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.").
54 On "waiver-in-litigation," see Lapides, 535 US at 622 ("This Court consistently has
found a waiver when a State's attorney general, authorized (as here) to bring a case in federal
court, has voluntarily invoked that court's jurisdiction."). On the necessity of waiving both un-
derlying immunity and immunity from federal jurisdiction, see Stewart, 393 F3d at 490 & n 5:
We therefore hold that North Carolina, having not already consented to suit in its own
courts, did not waive sovereign immunity by voluntarily removing the action to federal
court for resolution of the immunity question.
To be precise, by 'sovereign immunity' we are referring to the longstanding principle of
state sovereign immunity implicit in constitutional order, not the more narrow principle of
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
See also Estes v Wyoming Department of Transportation, 302 F3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir 2002)
(differentiating between sovereign immunity in federal courts granted by the Eleventh Amend-
ment and sovereign immunity against contract claims in state court); Watters v Washington Metro
Area Transit Authority, 295 F3d 36, 39-40 (DC Cir 2002) (noting that the two defendant states
possessed sovereign immunity from federal suits under the Eleventh Amendment, as well as
judicially created immunity from equitable liens in their own courts).
55 See Part I.A.I.
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For the sake of clarity, this Comment refers to the two-tiered
waiver system as consisting of horizontal waivers and vertical waivers.
A horizontal waiver occurs when a state legislature waives sovereign
immunity and allows for liability to be imposed on the state in a state
court. A vertical waiver occurs when a state litigator allows for federal
jurisdiction over a claim against the state. Part II.B discusses horizon-
tal waivers of immunity. Part II.C addresses vertical waivers.
B. Horizontal Waiver
Although § 1367(d) supplemental jurisdiction can only apply af-
ter a vertical waiver of immunity, the tolling provision's constitutional-
ity usually hinges on the terms of a prior horizontal waiver. The condi-
tions on a horizontal waiver of sovereign immunity (usually a statute)
delimit the matter over which a litigating officer may waive vertical
immunity. 6 Accordingly, the manner in which state courts construe the
statute of limitations on a horizontal waiver of sovereign immunity (as
conditions on liability vel non) is critical to a determination of
whether § 1367(d) may apply so as to expand those limits after verti-
cal waiver. Part II.B.1 discusses who has power to enact a horizontal
waiver. Part II.B.2 addresses the special role of the statute of limita-
tions as a condition on horizontal waiver. Part II.B.3 describes how
and when, in light of their status as potential conditions precedent to
horizontal waivers, limitations periods may be tolled.
1. Who can enact a horizontal waiver?
Whether a particular branch of government has the authority to
enact a horizontal waiver depends on whether state courts treat sov-
ereign immunity as a jurisdictional or a substantive matter. If a state
treats sovereign immunity as a substantive matter, then only a statute
or the state constitution can waive it." If a state treats sovereign im-
munity as a jurisdictional matter, then its constitution may delegate to
the legislature the power to waive immunity." In a few of these states,
56 Else state litigators could enact open-ended waivers of all of a state's immunity by re-
moving a case involving a single state statute to federal court. The author is aware of no state
that has adopted this policy. For further discussion of the ramifications of this limiting principle,
see Part III.
57 See University of Maryland v Maas, 173 Md 554, 197 A 123, 125 (1938) (noting that in
Maryland, which adheres to the theory of immunity from substantive liability, a state agency is
suable only if authorized by legislative action).
58 See Beers v Arkansas, 61 US (20 How) 527, 529 (1857) (noting that when a state consti-
tution delegates to the state legislature the power to waive jurisdictional immunity in state court,
the legislature retains a sovereign right to "prescribe the terms and conditions on which it con-
sents to be sued").
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such as New York, however, courts have ruled that sovereign immu-
nity is closely analogous to a defense against personal jurisdiction, and
they allow litigators to waive the underlying immunity by appearing
on behalf of the state in state court 9
The analysis in this Comment is unlikely to apply to the subgroup
of states that take the New York (jurisdictional/waiver-by-litigator)
approach.6° In New York, it is theoretically possible that a state litiga-
61
tor could make a vertical waiver without making a horizontal waiver.
But if a state litigator made a limited appearance in state court to re-
move a case to federal court, the issue upon returning to state court
would probably not be the statute of limitations, but rather whether
the state had reserved sovereign immunity in its own court. It would
be obvious that the state litigator had full authority to waive sovereign
immunity in both state and federal court and that he should have been
aware of the existence of the tolling provision for claims adjudicated
under federal supplemental jurisdiction, so the tolling provision would
likely apply in that situation without raising any constitutional difficul-
ties. Hence, the remainder of this Part focuses primarily on statutory
horizontal waivers, as opposed to horizontal waivers based on con-duct by state litigators.
2. Statutes of limitations: Interpretive presumptions and
conditions of waiver.
Statutes of limitations on statutory waivers of sovereign immu-
nity can, but do not always, serve as conditions on the existence of a
horizontal waiver. Where they are conditions, they are as much a
predicate of liability as, say, the commission of tortious conduct. It fol-
lows that a litigating officer may no more waive them than he might
unilaterally declare, with respect to a waiver of state immunity in tort,
that the state shall pay damages for an injury where no tort on the
63
state's part is alleged. Thus it is extraordinarily important, when con-
sidering whether a statute of limitations may be tolled, to determine
59 See, for example, 39th-40th Corp, 65 NYS2d at 713.
60 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire identified New York, Missouri, and Tennessee as
states adhering to this doctrine. See LaRoche v Doe, 134 NH 562,594 A2d 1297,1301 (1991).
61 See Stewart, 393 F3d at 490-91 n 5 (distinguishing this issue and refusing to decide the
question).
62 For the sake of simplicity, except where they are explicitly distinguished, this Comment
treats statutory and constitutional waivers of immunity as equivalent. The essential distinction is
between waivers that are written down before litigation begins and waivers that occur during
litigation.
63 See Sharafeldin, 854 A2d at 1219 ("The sovereign immunity that the State enjoyed re-
mained in effect; it could not be waived by subordinate agencies or their attorneys, and thus the
agencies were required by law to raise the defense.").
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whether the statute waiving immunity conditioned that waiver on the
claim being filed within the limitations period.
Although this Comment concerns state sovereign immunity, the in-
terpretation in federal court of waivers of sovereign immunity by the
federal government serves as a good example of horizontal waiver in-
terpretation. Federal waivers have a well-developed body of case law
and a number of states follow the general federal jurisdictional/waiver-
by-legislature approach." In the federal system, because the federal
government can only be sued for money damages in federal court,"
Congress almost exclusively enacts horizontal waivers. These waivers
are subject to two presumptive judicial constructions. First, unlike nor-
mal statutes of limitations, statutes of limitations in federal waivers of
sovereign immunity are presumptively deemed to be express conditions
of the waiver; if the conditions are not satisfied, federal courts lack ju-
risdiction." More controversially, under Irwin v Department of Veterans
Affairs,67 the statutes of limitations are also subject to the rebuttable
presumption that equitable tolling applies to them.-
One way to conceive of the idea of statutes of limitations as con-
ditions of waiver is to consider the common law distinction between
statutes of limitations that limit a right and those that bar a remedy. 6
At common law, most statutes of limitations were deemed procedural
because they were held merely to bar a remedy; the underlying right
against, say, tortious conduct, was still intact, but the plaintiff could no
longer obtain judicial redress for the violation of that right. However,for certain claims, including claims against the sovereign, the passage
64 See, for example, Henderson v Department of Correctional Services, 256 Neb 314, 589
NW2d 520, 522 (1999); LaRoche 594 A2d at 1301 (1991); Greenfield Construction Co, Inc v
Michigan Department of State Highways, 402 Mich 172,261 NW2d 718,723 (1978).
65 See 28 USC § 1346(b)(1) (2000) (providing that "the district courts ... shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages") (em-
phasis added).
66 United States v Mottaz, 476 US 834,841 (1986) ("When the United States consents to be
sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the court's jurisdiction.
In particular, '[w]hen waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision
constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity."') (internal citation omitted), quot-
ing Block v North Dakota, 461 US 273,287 (1983).
67 498 US 89 (1990).
68 Id at 95-96 (noting that "Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do so").
69 This distinction is still sometimes seen in choice-of-law cases. See William Richman and
William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws 293-94 (Lexis 2002):
The procedural classification depends on the notion that the running of the limitations pe-
riod affects only the remedy and not the right. If the foreign right and limitations period are
found to be closely linked, however, then the limitations period will be styled "substantive,"
and foreign law will be applied to determine if the claim is time-barred.
70 See Graves v Graves Executors, 5 Ky 207,208 (1810) ("The statute of limitations ... does
not destroy the right but withholds the remedy.").
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of the limitations period extinguishes not the remedy, but the right
itself.7 The combination of presumptions that applies to federal waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity thus means two things. It means that courts
assume that Congress intended to condition the very existence of a
right against the federal government on that right being asserted in
court within a given time period following its violation. But courts also
assume that Congress intended that the time period might sometimes
be extended by equitable tolling.72 Hence there is a subtle but ex-
tremely important difference between the application of statutes of
limitations in the sovereign immunity context and their application to
other causes of action.
3. Determining when statutes of limitations on waivers of
sovereign immunity may be tolled.
Despite the existence of the general interpretive presumptions
described above, determination of whether a limitations period is a
condition precedent to a horizontal waiver of immunity and thus not
subject to tolling is often a matter of particularized statutory interpre-
tation. The Irwin presumption that statutes of limitation on waivers of
sovereign immunity are subject to equitable tolling has been held not
to apply when a statute "uses language that is not simple" and "sets
forth its limitations in a highly detailed technical manner, that, linguis-
tically speaking, cannot easily be read as containing implicit excep-
tions."" One may think of this as the "complex language" rule: if Con-
gress sets forth enough details in its waiver of sovereign immunity, but
says nothing explicitly about tolling, courts will apply the expressio
unius canon of construction to determine that equitable tolling is not
authorized. If the waiver is not detailed, courts presume that the stat-
ute of limitations contains an implicit exception for circumstances that
give rise to equitable tolling.
Lower courts have further complicated matters by requiring that a
particular statute of limitations be jurisdictional in nature before they
71 See Mottaz, 476 US at 843 (internal citations omitted):
[T]he Act provides the United States' consent to suit concerning its claim to these lands,
provided, of course, that the plaintiff challenging the Government's title meets the conditions at-
tached to the United States' waiver of immunity.
The limitations period is a central condition of the consent given by the Act.
72 "Equitable tolling" is the postponement of an action's accrual because of circumstances
under which "a plaintiff has been 'prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his
rights."' Johnson v Nyack Hospital, 86 F3d 8, 12 (2d Cir 1996), quoting Miller v International
Telegraph & Telephone Corp, 755 F2d 20,24 (2d Cir 1985).
73 United States v Brockamp, 519 US 347,350 (1997).
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move on to the complex language determination." This extra step stems
from an attempt to reconcile Irwin with Soriano v United States," an
earlier case that held that deadlines defining the courts' jurisdiction are
not subject to equitable tolling.
Although Justice White and some lower courts believed that Ir-
win overruled Soriano,6 this does not seem to be the consensus in the
wake of later Supreme Court decisions." The current doctrine appears
to be that Congress has the right to use a statute of limitations as a
jurisdictional limitation in a waiver of sovereign immunity, but courts
must refer to the text of the statute to ensure that this was Congress's
intent. If Congress did intend a "jurisdictional" time limit, then Sori-
ano precludes application of equitable tolling. If not, then Irwin's pre-
sumption of equitable tolling applies unless it is rebutted by the com-
plex language rule."9
This process of determining when the statute of limitations at is-
sue is jurisdictional, however, handicaps the simplicity and loyalty to
congressional intent that the Irwin majority hoped would result from
the decision." Instead, Irwin has led to both internal and external cir-cuit splits regarding the interpretation of several statutes,8' and has
74 See, for example, Chung v United States Department of Justice, 333 F3d 273,277 (DC Cir
2003) (asking the initial question of "whether the injury to be redressed is of a type familiar to
private litigation" before reaching the issue of equitable tolling); Boos v Runyon, 201 F3d 178, 183
(2d Cir 2000) (finding that because federal sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, a limi-
tations period that does not speak to jurisdiction cannot be a condition of waiver).
75 352 US 270 (1957).
76 See Irwin, 498 US at 99-100 (White concurring); Oropallo v United States, 994 F2d 25,29
n 4 (1st Cir 1993) (articulating that "[the Court] would seem to have overruled or made irrele-
vant prior case law which sought to determine whether a particular limitations period could be
tolled by determining whether the time limit was jurisdictional or not").
77 See, for example, Neverson v Farquharson, 366 F3d 32, 40 n 8 (1st Cir 2004) (reasoning
that Soriano could be reconciled with Irwin).
78 See Boos, 201 F3d at 183 (using the statutory provision allowing employees of federal
agencies to sue in district court to discern whether Congress meant to deprive district courts of
jurisdiction).
79 See id (concluding that Congress did not mean to deprive the district court of jurisdic-
tion and, furthermore, "there is no indication in [the statute] ... that Congress intended to treat
the [ ] requirement [at issue] any differently than it treated the timeliness requirement before the
Court in Irwin").
80 See Irwin, 498 US at 95:
[A] continuing effort on our part to decide each case on an ad hoc basis, as we appear to
have done in the past, would have the disadvantage of continuing unpredictability without
the corresponding advantage of greater fidelity to the intent of Congress. We think that this
case affords us an opportunity to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of
equitable tolling in suits against the Government.
81 See, for example, Sharafeldin, 854 A2d at 1217 n 6 (cataloguing the internal and external
circuit splits in the federal courts).
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been sharply criticized for creating further discord in an already in-
consistent area of the law."
Moreover, in light of the confusion surrounding the interpreta-
tion of statutes of limitations on horizontal waivers in only one (fed-
eral) jurisdiction, the Raygor Court expressed skepticism that any
general presumptions would be appropriate in the state context where
fifty different jurisdictions apply their own interpretive rules to hori-
zontal waivers." As the Court surmised in Raygor, state courts' inter-
pretations of their own legislatures' consents to suit are inconsistent.
Some state courts have ruled that their states generally lack sovereign
immunity." Others engage in an analysis of legislative intent, treating
jurisdiction roughly like the federal process outlined above does. And
some, which view the underlying sovereign immunity as a substantive
immunity from liability, do not treat the statute of limitations as a ju-
risdictional condition, but rather as a condition of waiver protected
from judicial tolling because of the separation of powers doctrine."
In sum, two considerations are relevant for a federal court adju-
dicating a horizontal waiver of state immunity. First, the limitation
periods on some horizontal waivers are conditions precedent to the
waivers and are not subject to judicial tolling, at least as a matter of
state law. Second, it can require Byzantine analysis and intimate fa-
miliarity with a state's sovereign immunity jurisprudence to predict
exactly which waivers are so conditioned. As is discussed in greater
depth below, these individual state law considerations can have drastic
effects on litigants after a federal court discretionarily dismisses a
claim. As a result, courts may want to keep these horizontal waiver
considerations in mind when deciding how to dispose of vexing state
law claims after vertical waiver.
82 See Mallard Automotive Group, Ltd v United States, 343 F Supp 2d 949, 953 (D Nev
2004) (noting that although "it 'intended to create uniformity in this area, Irwin has appeared to
sow more confusion and disuniformity than existed earlier'), quoting Sharafeldin, 854 A2d at 1216.
83 Raygor, 534 US at 543 ("[T]his Court has never held that waivers of a State's immunity
presumptively include all federal tolling rules, nor is it obvious that such a presumption would be
'a realistic assessment of legislative intent."'), quoting Irwin, 498 US at 95.
84 See, for example, Pritchard v State, 163 Ariz 427,788 P2d 1178,1181-82 (1990).
85 See, for example, Bryant v Duval County Hospital Authority, 502 S2d 459,462 (Fla App
1986).
86 See Sharafeldin, 854 A2d at 1217-18 (refusing to apply Maryland's tolling provision after
dismissal from federal court because the statute of limitations was a condition precedent to the
waiver of substantive immunity).
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C. Vertical Waiver
Although statutory or constitutional provisions may express ver-
tical waivers of immunity," most vertical waivers are effected by state
litigators representing their states in court.
1. Written waivers.
A written provision must be extraordinarily explicit about verti-
cal waiver. The Supreme Court has refused to infer a vertical waiver
from a state statute that created a horizontal waiver by declaring the
state's intent to be available for suit in "courts of competent jurisdic-
tion." Most statutory waivers are too general to meet the Supreme
Court's criteria. Presumably the waiver would have to declare the
state's willingness to be sued specifically in federal court (rather than
in any "court of competent jurisdiction") for all claims arising under
the statute, making the possibility of vertical waiver by statute more
theoretical than real." Accordingly, a state typically waives vertical
immunity through its litigation conduct.'
2. Waivers through litigation conduct.
Waiver-in-litigation is restrictive. Federal courts will infer waiver
with respect to a particular claim based only on actions that are un-
87 See Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 238 n 1 (1985) (noting that "[a]
State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a state statute or constitutional
provision, or by otherwise waiving its immunity to suit in the context of a particular federal
program"). States are also deemed to have waived their sovereign immunity in suits by the
United States, United States v Texas, 143 US 621,646 (1892) (finding that Texas consented to suit
by the United States when the state was admitted into the Union), and by other states, Kansas v
Colorado, 206 US 46, 80-82 (1907) (asserting jurisdiction over controversies between the States
by virtue of Article III powers). Finally, the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction to review
matters of federal law raised in state court even when a state is a defendant. Cohens v Virginia,
19 US (1 Wheat) 264, 264 (1821) (acknowledging that the Court has appellate jurisdiction from
the final judgment of a state's highest court, even when the decision was rendered against the
United States). None of these latter three limitations on sovereign immunity is particularly im-
portant to the subject of this Comment. Additionally, though the Court once espoused the idea, a
state does not constructively waive sovereign immunity by participating in an activity subject to
congressional regulation. See College Savings Bank, 527 US at 678-83, overruling Parden v Ter-
minal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Dept, 377 US 184 (1964).
88 Kennecott Copper, 327 US at 579.
89 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 7.6 at 440 (Aspen 4th ed 2003) ("[T]he
Supreme Court's test is so stringent that it is quite unlikely that very many explicit [statutory]
state waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity will be found.").
90 See, for example, Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436, 447-48 (1883) (finding that because the
State of Rhode Island appeared in the cause, it voluntarily submitted to the courts' jurisdiction).
See also Department of Transportation of the State of Illinois v American Commercial Lines, Inc,
350 F Supp 835,837 (ND Ill 1972) (finding a voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction).
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dertaken by an officer of the state who has been vested with the ap-
propriate authority.
Many different kinds of litigation conduct suffice to waive immu-
nity. For example, states may waive immunity in litigation by partici-
pating in tax collection litigation" or by appearing as a claimant in an
interpleader proceeding. 2 The Supreme Court has indicated that con-
sent occurs when, "a State voluntarily invoke[s] federal court jurisdic-
tion or otherwise 'makes a "clear declaration" that it intends to submit
itself to our jurisdiction.'"
One clear way to waive an Eleventh Amendment defense through
litigation conduct is to consent to removal to federal court. In Lapides v
Board of Regents of University System of Georgia," Georgia, which had
been sued under the Georgia Tort Claims Act,"' removed the case to
federal court for the purpose of providing its fellow defendants, who did
not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity, the benefit of more
favorable interlocutory appeal procedures.9% Despite the state's objec-
tion that mere litigation conduct did not express the required "'clear'
indication of the State's intent to waive its immunity,"'" the Supreme
Court held that Georgia's consent to remove the case to federal court
constituted a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment privilege.98 The Court
noted that "whether a particular set of state laws, rules, or activities
amounts to a waiver of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity is a
question of federal law.""
Federal law, as a result of Lapides, puts vertical waiver power
squarely in the hands of state litigators. The case overruled a prior rule
requiring specific authorization for a state litigator to enact a waiver'°°
and instead found a waiver simply through removal by an officer ex-
ercising the delegated power "to represent the state in all civil actions
tried in any court.''
This background knowledge of history and waiver theory in hand,
we proceed to an analysis of the introductory hypothetical.
91 See Gunter v Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co, 200 US 273,284-85 (1906).
92 See Clark, 108 US at 448 (explaining that the state "became an actor as well as defen-
dant, as by its intervention the proceeding became one in the nature of an interpleader").
93 Raygor, 534 US at 547, quoting College Savings Bank, 527 US at 676.
94 535 US 613 (2002).
95 38 Ga Code Ann § 50-21-23 (LexisNexis 1994).
96 535 US at 621 (noting that even benign motives still indicate an intent to waive immunity).
97 Id at 620.
98 Id at 620-22.
99 Id at 623.
100 See Ford Motor Co v Dept of Treasury of Indiana, 323 US 459, 468-69 (1945) (noting
that the state could not waive its immunity in the absence of a proper, strictly construed delega-
tion of authority to the state attorney general).
101 Lapides, 535 US at 621-22, quoting Ga Code Ann § 45-15-3(6) (1990).
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III. DOES STATE LAW AUTHORIZE TOLLING?
The most straightforward way for our plaintiff from the introduc-
tory hypothetical to avoid the time bar would be to establish that the
statute of limitations on his state law claim was not a condition prece-
dent to the state's waiver of immunity from that cause of action. The
limitations period would then presumably be subject to equitable toll-
ing'o' and the plaintiff could proceed on the merits. If, however, the
plaintiff were not so lucky and, instead, the court determined that the
limitations period was a condition of waiver, he might nevertheless
argue that the state litigator, as a result of his delegated power to liti-
gate on behalf of the state, enjoyed the authority to consent on the
state's behalf pursuant to his discretion to pursue a given litigation
strategy. This Part considers the merits of such an argument and con-
cludes that they are not great.
A. Section 1367(d) at the Intersection of Horizontal and Vertical
Waivers of Immunity
Section 1367(d)'s tolling provision is at the crossroads between
horizontal and vertical waivers of sovereign immunity. If it applies as a
result of a vertical waiver, then the terms of the horizontal waiver may
be changed as well. The state might be made liable on a claim where
liability had been conditioned on the claim being filed (actually refiled
in our hypothetical) before it actually was. As discussed above, condi-
tions precedent not only eliminate the remedy, they extinguish the
underlying substantive right. 'o If a condition precedent exists, when a
state attorney general waives vertical immunity by consenting to ju-
risdiction in federal court he enlarges the scope of a substantive right
against the state. He is bringing the right into existence under condi-
tions where the terms of the legislative waiver would otherwise have
extinguished the right.
In states where waiver power resides with the legislature, legisla-
tive authority or a delegation thereof is required to accomplish this."
The relevant question then is: in light of Lapides's broad interpreta-
tion of an attorney general's delegated power to litigate and thereby
waive vertical immunity, may a state legislature also be deemed to
102 See, for example, Maryland v Sharafeldin, 382 Md 129, 854 A2d 1208, 1219-20 (2004)
(limitations periods that are not conditions precedent are subject to tolling).
103 See Part II.B.2.
104 See, for example, Sharafeldin, 854 A2d at 1218 (discussing separation of powers with
respect to who can waive immunity). See also LaRoche v Doe, 134 NH 562, 594 A2d 1297, 1301
(1991) ("Because the State's sovereign immunity may be waived only by the legislature, a fortiori
the State's actions in failing to swiftly seek dismissal of this case ... had no effect as a waiver of
the State's basic immunity from suit.").
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have delegated, with the litigating power, the power to modify condi-
tions on a horizontal waiver of immunity?
B. The Limits of Delegated Litigating Power
The answer to the above question is probably not. Our hypotheti-
cal state court, after the case was refiled, would quite possibly deter-
mine that the litigating officer's "consent" to the tolling provision was
an invalid attempt by an executive officer to exercise legislative power
by consenting to the modification of the terms of a state statute.
Although the existence of a vertical waiver is, according to
Lapides, a matter of federal law,' 5 the existence of a horizontal waiver
of state sovereign immunity is a matter of state law. Absent preemp-
tion, the state court is thus free to construe an attorney general's con-
sent to modification of a condition precedent to the existence of a
claim against the state as ultra vires and therefore invalid, and no fed-
eral court below the Supreme Court would have occasion to rule on
whether federal law preempted the state court's decision because the
tolling provision would only be at issue if the statute of limitations had
run after the case had been dismissed from federal district court.
Many states probably would consider the modification invalid. It
is one thing for a court to hold, as the Supreme Court has, that the
delegated power to litigate on behalf of the state in "any court" carries
with it the power to choose one's court even if the choice constitutes a
waiver of objection to its jurisdiction.' ' It is quite another to construe
the power to represent the state in any court to include the power to
consent to the rewriting of fundamental conditions of the claims at
issue in litigation.
The difference can be subtle, but it is critical. If the legislature
waives immunity subject to certain conditions, then empowers the
attorney general to litigate to determine whether those conditions are
met in a given instance, bad litigation strategy will, no doubt, expose
the state to damages in situations where, objectively, the relevant con-
ditions are not met. Incompetent litigation concerning the fulfillment
of the conditions, however, presents a different problem from allowing
the attorney general to alter one of the fundamental conditions by
105 535 US at 622 ("[Tlhis case involves a State that voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of
the federal court.").
106 See Sharafeldin, 854 A2d at 1218 (pointing out that the Maryland Supreme Court was not
bound by federal decisions when construing its own legislature's waiver of immunity in contract).
107 Lapides, 535 US at 620 ("And unless we are to abandon the general principle [that when
a state voluntarily agrees to remove a case to federal court it invokes federal court jurisdiction],
or unless there is something special about removal . . . the general legal principle requiring
waiver ought to apply.").
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consenting to an extension of the statute of limitations. In the former
scenario, the attorney general is not doing a good job performing his
duty to advocate to the court that the actions alleged do not violate an
existing right that gives rise to a cause of action against the state. In
the latter, he is altering one of the conditions that delimits the right
and thus expanding it beyond the scope defined by the legislature.
It is particularly unlikely that a state court would find a delega-
tion of power to the attorney general to consent to tolling in light of
some courts' preference for reading alleged legislative delegations of
waiver authority narrowly. "' Moreover, if a state legislature has writ-
ten a waiver of sovereign immunity with conditions precedent,' that
action itself seems to evince an intent not to delegate waiver power
with respect to those conditions. If the legislature were indifferent to
the tolling of the statute of limitations, it could have abstained from
rendering the limitations period a condition precedent to the exis-
tence of the claim. In sum, a state court might very reasonably deter-
mine that a state litigator's consent to the application of § 1367(d) was
ultra vires and thus void. Because the existence and terms of a hori-
zontal waiver are matters of state rather than federal law, the state
court determination would be final.
IV. DOES FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINE
INDEPENDENTLY REQUIRE TOLLING?
Even if he were thwarted on his state law theory, our hypothetical
plaintiff could still argue that federal law preempts the state law and
requires tolling. He might advance two theories. First, the plaintiff might
argue that Congress's statutory scheme, allowing for removal and toll-
ing, does not directly abrogate state sovereign immunity but rather
vests power to waive the immunity in state litigators and conditions
removal on consent to tolling. Second, the plaintiff might argue that
Eleventh Amendment immunity has been transformed into an analog
of a defense against personal jurisdiction,"" which, like immunity from
108 See, for example, Sharafeldin, 854 A2d at 1219 ("The sovereign immunity that the State
enjoyed remained in effect; it could not be waived by subordinate agencies or their attorneys,
and thus the agencies were required by law to raise the defense."); LaRoche, 594 A2d at 1300
("Our decisions have found express or implied consent only in the acts of our legislature.").
109 See, for example, Maryland Code Ann § 12-201 (2002) (conditionally waiving the Mary-
land's sovereign immunity in actions filed in Maryland appellate courts if certain requirements
are met); Sharafeldin, 854 A2d at 1219-20 (holding that Maryland's statute providing that an
action against the state for breach of contract is barred unless filed within a one year period is
not just a statute of limitations, but a condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity
and the action itself).
110 Justice Kennedy, who has advocated a shift towards treating Eleventh Amendment
immunity as similar to a defense against personal jurisdiction, has not said that it would actually
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personal jurisdiction, may be waived by the litigant's representative.
Against the background of such a principle, a state legislature's delega-
tion of vertical waiver power might be read as the removal of the limita-
tions period as a condition on the state's waiver of its (federal constitu-
tional) right of sovereign immunity in its own courts. Since the existence
of a waiver of the state's constitutional right would be a matter of fed-
eral law,"' it would preempt directly conflicting state law."'
Unlike the state law of horizontal waivers where state court de-
termination is final, our hypothetical plaintiff would be able to peti-
tion for certiorari from the Supreme Court to adjudicate these federal
questions, but neither the Supreme Court nor the state courts would
likely be persuaded by these arguments. Part IV.A considers and re-
jects the idea that Congress has delegated (or could delegate) waiver
authority from a state legislature to a state litigator. It also rejects the
idea that Congress could condition state access to federal court on
waiver of immunity in state court. Part IV.B addresses the contention
that state sovereign immunity has been transformed into an immunity
analogous to a defense against personal jurisdiction.
A. Forced Delegation by Congress and Unconstitutional Conditions
on State Access to Federal Court
If his arguments under state law failed, our plaintiff might still
emphasize that federal law nevertheless provides state litigators with
broad waiver authority. It should be frankly admitted that the Court in
Lapides demonstrated little interest in parsing the niceties of state
delegations of power and described state delegation statutes as only
one element in the determination of the federal law of waiver author-
be an immunity from "personal" jurisdiction over the state. See Wisconsin Department of Correc-
tions v Schacht, 524 US 381, 395 (1998) (Kennedy concurring) ("The Court could eliminate the
unfairness by modifying our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence to make it more consistent
with our practice regarding personal jurisdiction."). Professor Caleb Nelson, who also advocates
treating sovereign immunity, in many instances at least, as a doctrine of personal jurisdiction,
suggests that state sovereign immunity does not actually implicate jurisdiction in personam but
rather, in the understanding of the Framers, forecloses the existence of a case or controversy
within the meaning of Article III by destroying one party's amenability to suit. See Caleb Nelson,
Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 Harv L Rev 1559,1585-87 (2002).
It would seem incongruous with the Due Process clauses, in which the doctrine of personal juris-
diction is constitutionally grounded, to treat sovereign immunity as a defense against personal
jurisdiction because states are not persons within the meaning of those clauses.
111 Lapides, 535 US at 622-23. ("As in analogous contexts, in which such matters are ques-
tions of federal law, whether a particular set of state laws, rules, or activities amounts to a waiver
of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of federal law.") (internal citations
omitted).
112 See US Const Art VI, cl 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
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ity." In light of this broad application of removal power, our hypo-
thetical plaintiff might contend that the statutory scheme that Con-
gress has enacted in order to allow states to remove cases to federal
courts effects a delegation of waiver power, as a matter of federal
statutory law, from state legislatures to state litigators. Moreover,
Lapides emphasized fairness and it would be senseless and unfair to
create a federal rule that allowed for a state to waive immunity from
federal jurisdiction over a cause of action, then claim immunity piece
by piece from every federal rule. It is unlikely that a state could waive
immunity from jurisdiction by removal, then claim it was immune
from the Federal Rules of Evidence. Hence, our plaintiff might say,
Lapides not only outlines a broad power for state litigators to waive
immunity but also establishes a federal policy that forbids piecemeal
waiver. When a litigator removes a case to federal court, he waives all
relevant immunities and the state is bound by this waiver. This argu-
ment would likely fail.
1. Forced delegations of state power by Congress.
If Congress wishes to alter the balance of functions among the
sovereign authorities of a state government, it must first make its in-
tention to do so clear.' However, neither § 1367(d) nor the primary
removal statute"' mention sovereign states as litigants. As a result, a
court would likely never reach the question of whether Congress
could authorize a state officer to waive a state's underlying sovereign
immunity. If a court did consider the question, this sort of forced dele-
gation would look a lot like constitutionally impermissible comman-
deering. The Supreme Court has determined that Congress may not
force a state to open its courts to hear claims against itself in deroga-
tion of its sovereign immunity."6 If Congress may not abrogate the
power of a state legislature to limit state court jurisdiction over claims
against the state and endow the state court with authority to deter-
mine whether the state shall be liable, it follows that Congress may not
seize waiver authority from the state legislature and vest that author-
ity in state litigators. Even if such forced delegation might be "neces-
113 535 US at 623.
114 See Will v Michigan Department of State Police, 491 US 58, 65 (1989), quoting Rice v
Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 218, 230 (1947) ("Congress should make its intention 'clear and
manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.").
115 28 USC § 1441 (2000).
116 See generally Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999).
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sary ... for carrying into Execution"'' 7 Congress's power to "constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,""..8 it would not be proper. The
Supreme Court has stated in an analogous context:
When a "La[w] ... for carrying into Execution" the Commerce
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the
various constitutional provisions ... it is not a "La[w] ... proper
for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause," and is thus, in
the words of The Federalist, "merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation"
which "deserve[s] to be treated as such." 9
Accordingly, not only does the statutory scheme in question not con-
tain a clear enough statement to manifest congressional intent to ef-
fect a federal delegation of waiver authority from one branch of state
government to another, Congress lacks power under the Constitution
to effect such a delegation at all.
2. Section 1367(d) as a condition of waiver.
Even if Congress could delegate to a state litigator the power to
waive the state's horizontal immunity, § 1367(d) would operate as an
unconstitutional condition on state access to federal jurisdiction.
Unlike, say, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the tolling provision cre-
ates a waiver of liability from individual suit during the period in
which the statute of limitations is tolled.' ° Demanding consent to toll-
ing as a condition on state access to federal supplemental jurisdiction
runs afoul of the rule that Congress may not "exact constructive waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity through the exercise of Article I powers"
121
when it allows states to participate in a federal program. Congress
may restrict state access to federal court, but it may not condition such
access on a waiver of sovereign immunity from private suit.
While it might seem strange to say that Congress may not condi-
tion a waiver of immunity on a waiver of immunity, one must remember
that both vertical and horizontal immunity are constitutional rights, the
117 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18. See also McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (1 Wheat) 316,414-15
(1819) (stating that "necessary" does not mean "absolutely necessary" in all contexts, but can be
used in various senses).
118 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 9.
119 Printz v United States, 521 US 898,923-24 (1997), quoting US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18, and
Federalist 33 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 203,207 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cook, ed).
120 It is a waiver when the suit would not otherwise be allowed, that is, where the statute of
limitations is a condition precedent to existence of the right of action against the state. If the
limitations period is not a condition precedent, then, as noted above in Part III.A, tolling pre-
sents no constitutional problem.
121 College Savings Bank, 527 US at 683, overruling Parden v Terminal Railway of the Ala-
bama State Docks Department, 377 US 184 (1964).
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former represented by the Eleventh Amendment and the latter "im-
plicit in [the] constitutional order."' Insofar as "constructive consent is
not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional
rights,"' the exercise of one right, such as the right to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity, may not be conditioned on the waiver of an-
other, such as the right to retain underlying immunity. The same princi-
ple that prevents Congress from conditioning the receipt of a patent on
the waiver of the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
prevents the application of the tolling provision in this case.
B. Why Lapides Did Not Represent a Shift to the Jurisprudence of
Personal Jurisdiction
Disappointed by the failure of his argument that federal statutory
law empowered the state litigator to waive the state's horizontal im-
munity, our hypothetical plaintiff might nevertheless argue that Lapides
represented a sea change in the treatment of Eleventh Amendment
immunity-that is, into an analog of an immunity against personal
jurisdiction. If enacted against a background principle of sovereign
immunity as a facsimile of a defense against personal jurisdiction, a
state legislature's delegation of litigating authority might be deemed,
as a matter of federal law, to supersede the legislature's earlier condi-
tion on horizontal waiver. This would allow for tolling if the litigator
consented to federal jurisdiction and ironically short circuit the un-
constitutional condition argument in any particular case.
Unfortunately for our hypothetical plaintiff, Lapides addressed only
the scope of an attorney general's delegated power; it did not alter the
nature of Eleventh Amendment federal jurisdictional immunity. A pos-
sible source of confusion, however, is the Supreme Court's statement in
Lapides that it overruled Ford Motor Co v Department of Treasury of
Indianan "insofar as it would otherwise apply."126 Ford involved an ultra
122 Stewart v North Carolina, 393 F3d 484,490 n 5 (4th Cir 2005). See also Alden, 527 US at
754 ("In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that
the States retain immunity from private suits in their own courts, an immunity beyond the con-
gressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.").
123 College Savings Bank v Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527
US 666,681 (1999), quoting Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651,673 (1974).
124 This result is not mandated. Although personal jurisdiction gives rise to broad judicial
power over a litigant, it is not clear that mere awareness of this fact should change the specificity
with which a state legislature must condition a waiver of immunity. Nevertheless, the argument
warrants caution. On the broad consequences of waiver of personal jurisdiction, see Gil Seinfeld,
Waiver-in-Litigation: Eleventh Amendment Immunity and the Voluntariness Question, 63 Ohio St
L J 871,927 (2002).
125 323 US 459 (1945).
126 535 US at 623.
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vires waiver that was classified as such by the state only after the case
had been appealed. The Court distinguished Lapides from Ford on the
grounds that, in the latter, the state had been sued in federal court,
whereas in Lapides, the state had voluntarily invoked the federal
court's jurisdiction by consenting to removal. 7 This distinction is impor-
tant because the precise issue at stake in Ford was not whether sover-
eign immunity could be raised for the first time on appeal, but rather
whether the Attorney General could waive it at all.' In fact, the Court
only later established that sovereign immunity could be raised as a de-
fense for the first time on appeal.'29 Thus, one decision addressed the
separation of powers and the extent to which waiver authority had been
delegated, while the other decision concerned the nature of the jurisdic-
tional immunity enshrined in the Eleventh Amendment. Since Lapides
overruled only the decision specifically concerning the separation of
powers, it follows that the nature of Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional
immunity remained untouched.i'
This conclusion is reinforced by an examination of Lapides's
treatment of other cases addressing the nature of the jurisdictional im-
munity. For example, prior to Lapides, Justice Kennedy suggested that
the Court should consider making Eleventh Amendment immunity
analogous to a lack of personal jurisdiction defense-one that would
have to be raised in the defendant's answer or would otherwise be
waived.'3' However, he also explicitly proposed a less drastic alterna-
tive -that state attorneys general waive their jurisdictional "defense" if
they affirmatively invoke federal court jurisdiction by consenting to
removal from state court."' The Court in Lapides opted for the less
127 Id at 622 (emphasizing the distinction between voluntary and involuntary appearance in
federal court).
128 323 US at 466 ("It remains to be considered whether the attorney general for the State
of Indiana in his conduct of the present proceeding has waived the state's immunity from suit.").
129 See Edelman, 415 US at 677-78 (reasoning that because the Eleventh Amendment defense
was jurisdictional in nature, it need not be raised in the trial court).
130 See Maysonet-Robles v Cabrero, 323 F3d 43, 51 (1st Cir 2003) (citing Lapides for the
single proposition that a state may waive its immunity by voluntarily invoking federal jurisdic-
tion through affirmative litigation conduct). See also Eric S. Johnson, Note, Unsheathing Alexan-
der's Sword: Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 51 Am U L Rev
1051, 1062-63 (2002) (reaffirming that "the holding in Lapides did not depend on resolving the
inconsistent nature of the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar"). But see Porterfield,
Comment, 55 Baylor L Rev at 1277 (cited in note 30) (encouraging a broader reading of Lapides
to clarify the jurisdictional nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Jonathan R. Siegel, Waiv-
ers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 Duke L J 1167,
1217-18 (2003) (arguing for a broad rule of waiver following the "spirit" of the Lapides decision).
131 See note 110.
132 See Schacht, 524 US at 397 (Kennedy concurring) ("If the States know or have reason to
expect that removal will constitute a waiver, then it is easy enough to presume that an attorney
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drastic of Justice Kennedy's two options and framed the issue before it
as whether "a state waive[s] its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its
affirmative litigation conduct when it removes a case to federal court.' 3
In order to answer that question, the Court did not engage in an ab-
stract discussion about the nature of jurisdiction. Instead, it looked to
the broad power to litigate conferred on the state attorney general by a
Georgia statute, and determined that it would promote fairness to es-
tablish a rule that broad power under state law to represent the state
"in any court" renders a state attorney general competent to waive state
immunity from federal jurisdiction.'
As even some of the most ardent advocates of an expansion in
waiver doctrine acknowledge, it is implausible that a unanimous Court
overruled hundreds of years of precedent establishing the hybrid na-
ture of Eleventh Amendment immunity without either using the
words "personal jurisdiction" or citing any prior case in which the na-
ture of the jurisdictional immunity was at issue. ' Courts that treat
state immunity from federal jurisdiction as analogous to a defense
against personal jurisdiction do so in error. They should instead look to
an attorney general's authority to litigate to determine if his waiver of
immunity was valid.
V. ESTOPPEL
In the alternative, if all of his other legal arguments are deter-
mined to be meritless, our hypothetical plaintiff might still argue that
the state, having consented to federal jurisdiction, ought to be es-
topped, as a matter of federal law, from denying that it consented to
individual elements of that jurisdiction like the tolling provision. This
estoppel could occur regardless of whether the state legislature had
explicitly or impliedly authorized the state litigator to waive horizon-
tal immunity. One commentator, Gil Seinfeld, points out that many
parties in litigation are bound by the conduct of their attorneys, re-
gardless of whether the parties authorized this conduct themselves or
whether it may lead to the waiver of constitutionally rooted rights."
For example, if a private litigant instructs his lawyer to object to the
authorized to represent the State can bind it to the jurisdiction of the federal court (for Eleventh
Amendment purposes) by the consent to removal.").
133 Lapides, 535 US at 617 (internal citations omitted).
134 Id at 624.
135 See Hien Ngoc Nguyen, Comment, Under Construction: Fairness Waiver, and Hypotheti-
cal Eleventh Amendment Jurisdiction, 93 Cal L Rev 587, 621 (2005) (asserting that "[tihe Su-
preme Court is unlikely to enact a sweeping change in jurisdictional characterization suddenly").
136 See Seinfeld, 63 Ohio St L J at 927 (cited in note 124).
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court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him, and the lawyer fails
to do so, the litigant is nonetheless bound by the court's jurisdiction 37
With respect to the tolling provision, however, such estoppel is
unlikely to occur. As Seinfeld notes, the two cases of Office of Personnel
Management v Richmond -which held that the representations of
government agents do not subject the government to collateral estop-
pel '3 -and Monell v Department of Social Services of the City of New
York"' -which held that respondeat superior liability does not apply to
states as it does to individuals in principal-agent relationships ' -
indicate that the Supreme Court hesitates to apply common law doc-
trines such as estoppel to the government. ' Seinfeld asserts that these
cases are inapplicable to the waiver-in-litigation context because they
were applied in areas where it would have been much more difficult for
the government to monitor all of its agents.'3 In contrast, "demanding
that state attorneys keep apprised of state policy regarding waiver of
immunity would seem to be a very basic element of internal manage-
ment within a state Attorney General's office."' "
This would be a good policy indeed, but it argues, at most, for cre-
ating a presumption that litigating officers enjoy some delegated power
to waive jurisdictional immunity. This was exactly the more limited po-
sition previously advocated by Justice Kennedy'' and adopted by the
Court in Lapides.Y4 However, neither position calls into question the
legislature's ability to rebut the presumption by passing a statute that
explicitly denies litigating officers the power to waive sovereign im-
munity, at least where a state constitution vests the power to waive
immunity in the legislative branch.' 7 Likewise, a state law making the
statute of limitations a condition precedent on a waiver of immunity
137 Id.
138 496 US 414 (1990).
139 Id at 419, 434 (acknowledging that "equitable estoppel will not lie against the Govern-
ment as it lies against private litigants," and concluding that the respondent had no authority to
advance the monetary claim seeking public funds).
140 436 US 658 (1978).
141 Id at 694 (stating that a local government can only be sued under 28 USC § 1983 for an
injury inflicted as a result of government policy or custom).
142 See Seinfeld, 63 Ohio St L J at 927 n 293 (cited in note 124).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See Wisconsin Department of Corrections v Schacht, 524 US 381, 397 (1998) (Kennedy
concurring) (advocating "adopting a rule of waiver in every case where the State, through its
attorneys, consents to removal from the state court to the federal court").
146 535 US at 623 ("A rule of federal law that finds waiver through a state attorney general's
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction avoids inconsistency and unfairness.").
147 See, for example, Ga Const Art I, § II, 9 (vesting the power to waive the state's sover-
eign immunity in the General Assembly).
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contradicts a presumption of waiver power and no doctrine of estop-
pel should save such a claim from being thrown out.
Estoppel is particularly unlikely to apply to the defendant state in
our hypothetical case. First, as the framers of the Eleventh Amend-
ment,"8 the Court in Richmond,", and the Court in Monell each ar-
ticulated, the depletion of government treasuries as a result of the
misbehavior of state officers should not be permitted. More impor-
tantly, however, the Court in New York v United States"' made clear
that regardless of practical considerations, such a violation of state
sovereignty could not stand."2 Congress does not have the authority
under Articles I and III to delegate full waiver power from a state leg-
islature to an attorney general, and "[tlhe constitutional authority of
Congress cannot be expanded by the 'consent' of the governmental
unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Ex-
ecutive Branch or the States."..3 Thus, a consenting state should not be
estopped from arguing that any waiver-in-litigation of the tolling pro-
vision was ultra vires and therefore invalid.
CONCLUSION
When litigation commences, the issues considered in this Com-
ment are unlikely to be at the forefront of anyone's mind. However, in
a case where the tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction
statute conflicts with a state statute of limitations that conditions state
liability, the consequences to the plaintiff of a miscalculation would be
severe: an otherwise meritorious claim against a defendant state might
be foreclosed on the basis of what would certainly seem to the plain-
tiff to be an arcane technicality.
148 See Currie, Constitution in Congress at 196 (cited in note 14) (discussing the public
outcry after Chisholm against "prospective raids on state treasuries" and the resulting legislative
response, the Eleventh Amendment).
149 496 Us at 433 ("To open the door to estoppel claims would only invite endless litigation
over both real and imagined claims of misinformation by disgruntled citizens, imposing an un-
predictable drain on the public fisc.").
150 436 US at 691 ("[W]e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because
it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on
a respondeat superior theory.") (emphasis omitted).
151 505 US 144 (1992).
152 See id at 157, quoting United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 63 (1936):
Our task would be the same even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages
to anyone. It consists not of devising our preferred system of government, but of under-
standing and applying the framework set forth in the Constitution. "The question is not
what power the Federal Government ought to have but what powers in fact have been
given by the people."
153 New York, 505 US at 182.
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If a lawsuit is filed in, or is removed to, federal court, that court
should be aware that if it chooses to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over a state law claim against a state, it may later be confronted
by the unpleasant options of reluctantly retaining jurisdiction over a
vexing but possibly meritorious state law claim, or as a practical mat-
ter, ending the lawsuit by dismissing the case and forcing the plaintiff
to refile in state court. The choice is hard, but the Supreme Court's
recent federalism jurisprudence does not brook exceptions on the ba-
sis of convenience. The apparent trifle of civil procedure addressed by
this Comment may be worth considering at the beginning of litigation
rather than at its potentially abrupt end.
